Tree Products Company, an Oregon corporation v. Amiron Development Company, a Utah corporation; Basin State Bank, et al.: Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1986
Tree Products Company, an Oregon corporation v.
Amiron Development Company, a Utah
corporation; Basin State Bank, et al.: Brief of
Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Clark B. Allred; Gale F. McKeachnie; Nielson & Senior; Attorneys for Defendant and Appellee Basin
State Bank
Dean H. Becker; Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellant Tree Products Company
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Tree Products v. Amiron Development, No. 198620660.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1986).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/1365
45.9 
.3 
'Itt 
acbbo 
SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
TREE PRODUCTS COMPANY, an 
Oregon corporation, 
Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
vs. 
AMIRON DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation; BASIN 
STATE BANK, et al. 
No. 20660 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL 
Clark B. Allred 
Gale F. McKeachnie 
NIELSON & SENIOR 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Appellee Basin State Bank 
363 East Main Street 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
Telephone: (801) 789-4908 
Dean H. Becker 
Attorney for Plaintiff and 
Appellant Tree Products 
Company 
4059 S. 4000 W. 
West Valley City, Utah 84120 
Telephone: (801) 967-5500 
£1 
J h 
JAN 311936 
C c»K, Sup'ome Ccurt, Utah 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Section Heading Page No. 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 2 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 2 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 4 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 4 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 10 
ARGUMENT 11 
CONCLUSION 31 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 31 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASE LAW PAGE 
Arizona Title Insurance and Trust Co. v. O'Malley 18 
Lumber Co., 14 Ariz.App. 486, 484 P.2d 639 (1971) 
Banbury v. Bank of Montreal, [1918-19] E.R. Rep. 1; 27 
[1918] A.C. 626. 
Christenson v. Commonwealth Land Title, 15 
666 P.2d 302 (1983) 
Doyle v. Chatham Bank, 253 N.Y. 369, 171 N.E. 574 17 
(1930) ; 
Ellis v. Hale 13 Utah 2d 279, 373 P.2d 382 (1962) 13 
Glanxer v. Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275, 17 
23 A.L.R. 1425 (1923) 
Hedley Byrne &Co., Ltd. v. Heller & Partners, [1963] 11 
2 All E.R. 583 
Jardine v. Brunswick Corporation, 18 Utah 2d 378, 14 
423 P.2d 659 (1967) 
Mulroy v. Wright, 185 Mich. 84, 240 N.W. 116 17 
(1932) 
2 
Nevada National Bank v. Gold Star Meat Company 19 
514 P.2d 651 (1973) 
Staker v. Huntingon Cleveland Irrigation Company 25 
664 P.2d 1188 (1983) 
Valley Bank and Trust Co. v.Wilken 668 P 2d. 493 25 
(1983) 
W.B. Anderson & Sons v. Rhodes, 862 [1967] 2 All E.R. 26 
W.W.&W.B. Gardner, Inc. v. Pappas 24 Utah 2d 264, 24 
470 P.2d 252 (1970) 
RESTATEMENT 
Restatement of Torts 18-19 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Rule 8(c) 23 
Rule 12 (h) 24 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. 25-5-5 26 
TREATISE 
56 ALR 3d 1037 30 
1 F. Harper & F. James, Section 7.6 at 546. 17 
Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts Section 102 at 719 18 
et seq. (3rd ed. 1964) 
3 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The sole issue for determination by the Court is an issue of 
first impression in the State of Utah: whether a bank which 
responds to an inquiry regarding the status of an account owes a 
duty to the inquirer to respond accurately where reliance on the 
response is reasonably foreseeable? 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. BACKGROUND 
In October of 1981, Bales Construction Company, a Utah corp-
oration ("Bales") purchased, with a loan from Basin State Bank 
("Basin State"), certain real property located in Uintah County, 
State of Utah. Within a month, Bales and its companion company, 
Amiron Development Company ("Amiron") obtained a loan for 
$2,300,000.00 from a consortium of out-of-state banks to develop 
a condominium project on the site in Vernal, Utah known as Ashley 
Park. 
Acting as the disbursing and servicing agent for the project 
for the funding banks, Basin State was to "receive the draw 
requests from the contractor; prepare the construction drafts; 
inspect the project or see that the project was inspected; make 
out a participation certificate to send to the lenders; receive 
the requested funds from the lenders; and to release the con-
struction drafts to the contractor." (Deposition of Dan Turner, 
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p. 26, lines 17-23) In addition, pursuant to their Construction 
Agreement, Basin State was to make draws based upon the "itemiza-
tion of expenditures to date . . . of all items due and unpaid, 
and all items necessary for completion, showing the percent of 
completion of each of the buildings and improvements under con-
struction to such date." (Affidavit of Mike Rasmussenf pp. 4-5, 
para. 13). 
In February of 1982f the developers had to modify the pro-
ject to meet flood plain requirements, which increased the cost 
of the project, but such information was never conveyed to the 
lenders by Basin State as Basin State was originally requested by 
the Developers. (Affidavit of Kevin Bales, pp. 3-4, para. 13-
15). Basin State also failed to track the exact percentage 
completion of the project or the amount of funds remaining in the 
account as required by their Construction Agreement. (Deposition 
of Dan Turner, page 36, lines 22 through 25). Finally, Basin 
State was less than enthusiastic in their inspection of the 
project (Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of 
Objection to Motion for Summary Judgment, pp. 3-4, para 13, 14). 
In May of 1982, the Plaintiff/Appellant ("Tree Products"), 
a lumber products company located in the State of Oregon, was 
requested to supply cedar siding to the Ashley Park project. 
Being prudent with their extensions of credit, Tree Products 
contacted the Basin State official in charge of inspecting the 
project and dispensing project funds (Deposition of Dan Turner, 
p. 27, lines 3-5) and inquired about both the current financial 
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status of the project and the development history of the project 
(Affidavit of Donald Fraser, p. 2, para. 8). Tree Products was 
concerned that it be assured of payment for the siding which was 
worth approximately $70,000, and looked to the officials of 
Basin State to accurately communicate to it the financial health 
of the Ashley Park project. 
In spite of the difficulties which loomed over the project, 
the credit manager of Basin State reported to Tree Products that 
the project was "fully funded," "that the funds were in escrow," 
and that it could rely on Amiron and Bales to pay their obliga-
tions. (Affidavit of Donald Fraser, p. 2). It is also the testi-
mony of Donald Fraser, credit manager for Tree Products, that 
In all my years of banking and credit experience, 
the recommendation of Bales Credit by Basin State Bank 
was as strong a recommendation as I had ever received 
before. I felt very good about the representation 
made by Basin State Bank and felt that Tree Products 
Company could justifiably rely thereon. (Affidavit of 
Donald Fraser, p. 3). 
Thus assured, Tree Products took the representations of Basin 
State's credit manager at his word and delivered substantial 
amounts of cedar siding to the Ashley Park Development. 
After delivery of the product to the Ashley Park Project and 
subsequent tender of payment by Bales/Amiron, a dispute arose 
between Tree Products and Bales/Amiron concerning the price 
charged for the cedar siding. Before making a decision regarding 
the dispute, Tree Products consulted with Basin State again in 
July of 1982 respecting the financial status of the project and 
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was informed again that the project was "fully funded," that the 
invoices "would be paid," and that "there was no need to worry 
about that account." (Affidavit of Joseph Zabaldo at 4, para. 
18). Assured by Basin State's representations (Affidavit of 
Joseph Zabaldo at 5, para. 21), Tree Products continued to nego-
tiate with the project managers and the officers of Basin State 
concerning the pricing differences, but the negotiations were 
too late. 
In September of 1982, the construction loan was depleted. 
The lending banks thereafter refused to extend the loan and the 
project was left uncompleted, $250,000.00 over budget. Amiron 
and Bales are insolvent. Tree Productfs materialman's lien is 
worthless, being junior to the first mortgage held by the bank 
consortium, which mortgage equals or exceeds the value of the 
project. Tree Products has not been paid for its siding, and 
there are no prospects for payment from the contractor. 
B. STATUS OF LITIGATION 
Litigation has ensued, with Tree Products suing the Respon-
dents for fraud, negligence, breach of contract, failure to meet 
the bonding statute, quantum meruit, partnership, ultra vires 
acts, co-mingling of funds, and breach of fiduciary duty. All 
causes of action with the exception of the cause of action for 
negligence were either dismissed by stipulation or by Order of 
the Court. 
Finally, the Defendant Basin State Bank brought a Motion for 
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Summary Judgment against the Appellant with respect to the Appel-
lant's eleventh cause of action based on negligence on the 
grounds that: 
1. No duty was owed by Basin State to Tree Products; 
2. Damages to Tree Products were caused by Tree 
Productfs refusal of the tendered checks and not by any 
negligence of Basin State; and 
3. Any claims based upon misrepresentation regarding 
credit are barred by Utah Code Section 25-5-5. 
Tree Products then brought a Cross-Motion for Summary 
Judgment on the grounds of: 
1. Breach of duty to properly inspect the construction 
progress; 
2. Breach of duty to monitor the construction loan; 
3. Breach of duty to prudently disburse the loan 
proceeds; 
4. Breach of duty to communicate accurate information 
of the project to Tree Products; and 
5. Negligent misrepresentation of the status of the 
project. 
According to the Ruling entered by the Court, the parties 
agreed at the trial court level that the facts, essentially as 
set forth above in the Facts section, supra, were undisputed. 
After reviewing the facts of the case and the memorandum of the 
parties, the Seventh District Court, the Honorable Richard C. 
Davidson presiding, stated in his Ruling as follows: 
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Plaintiff Tree Products alleges that Basin State Bank 
had a duty to inspect the project, to supervise and manage 
the loan and that such duty was owed to Tree Products. 
However, the facts in this case show that the loan 
agreement was entered into between Basin State Bank and 
Amiron Development. Subsequently, the funds were disbursed 
at the direction of Amiron. While Tree Products may have 
been an ultimate beneficiary of that agreement, no duty 
exists on the part of the bank which is owed to them.[stet] 
In addition, in carrying out its duty to Amiron, Basin 
State did tender payment to Tree Products but due to 
controversy with Amiron, Tree Products refused payment. 
At the direction of Amiron, the money was utilized to pay 
other bills. 
The argument of Plaintiff Tree Products would place the 
bank in the position of owing conflicting duties and of 
owing duties not contemplated in the making of the 
construction loan. The bank would be set up in the 
position of project overseer and manager not only of the 
construction funding but also of the actual construction. 
This is not such a duty as any bank would contract for and 
is not what was done here. 
It is from the final ruling of Judge Davidson that Tree 
Products appeals, contending in its appeal that, once it under-
took the dispensing of credit information regarding its custo-
mers, Basin State does indeed have a duty to correctly and 
accurately report to any inquirer the facts regarding the status 
of an account when it can be reasonably anticipated that the 
inquirer will rely upon such statements to determine the course 
of its future business dealings. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Clear precedent from this and other jurisdictions estab-
lishes that when an entity, such as the bank in this case, under-
takes to provide information regarding the credit status of a 
customer, it has a duty of due care in dispensing such informa-
tion. The multiple factor analysis adopted by this Court in 
Christenson vs. Commonwealth Land Title, infra, establishes that 
Appellee Basin State Bank both had a duty to Appellant and 
breached that duty. Basin State had a pecuniary interest in the 
affairs of its customer regarding whom Appellant inquired, was in 
a superior position to have knowledge regarding its customer, was 
negligent in providing information regarding its customer, and 
knew or should have known that Appellant would rely on such 
information. Plaintiffs resulting reliance on Appelleefs infor-
mation was reasonable and resulted in substantial damage to 
Appellant1s interests. 
Basin State should not be permitted to escape its obligation 
of due care because of the provisions of the Utah statute of 
frauds, otherwise known as Lord Tenderton's act. First, Basin 
State failed to plead the affirmative defense of the Statute of 
Frauds in its answer and is now precluded from raising the de-
fense. Second, the provision, as authoritatively interpreted by 
the English House of Lords, was originally designed to prevent a 
litigant from "pleading around" the statute of frauds as it was 
not designed to permit a defendant from escaping its obligations 
under the "reasonableness" standard applied in negligence cases. 
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ARGUMENT 
A. A BANK HAS THE DUTY TO CAREFULLY RESPOND TO INQUIRIES OF 
OTHERS CONCERNING THE STATUS OF A CUSTOMER OR AN ACCOUNT WHEN IT 
CAN BE REASONABLY ANTICIPATED THAT THE INQUIRER WILL REASONABLY 
RELY ON THE REPRESENTATIONS OF THE BANK 
This case presents a narrow legal issue: whether a bank has 
the duty to carefully respond to inquiries of others concerning 
the status of a customer or an account when it can be reasonably 
anticipated that the inquirer will reasonably rely on the repre-
sentations of the bank. Logic and clear precedent from Utah and 
other jurisdictions suggest only one answer: appellee bank had a 
duty to appellant that was breached in the circumstances of this 
case. The trial court accordingly erred when it dismissed appel-
lant's claim. 
i. Cases from this and other jurisdictions establish a 
duty on the part of the appellee bank. 
One of the most eloquent legal opinions discussing whether 
a cause of action exists for negligent misrepresentation is the 
English case of Hedley Byrne & Co., Ltd. v. Heller & Partners, 
[1963] 2 All E.R. 583. The matter, brought before the House of 
Lords in 1963, involved a bank which inquired of another bank 
concerning the financial position of a customer. The inquiry was 
"in confidence and without responsibility" on the part of the 
responding bank, which replied that the customer was a good 
11 
customer and trustworthy. The inquiring bank then granted a loan 
to the customer, the customer promptly became insolvent, the 
money was lost and never repaid, and the inquiring bank sued the 
responding bank for negligence. 
The defense to the action was that no cause of action arose 
in negligence because there was no affirmative duty of care on 
the part of the responding bank to the inquiring bank. The 
Lords quickly dissected the issue per Lord Hale: 
A reasonable man, knowing that he was being trusted or 
that his skill and judgment were being relied on, I 
think, has three courses open to him. He could keep 
silent or decline to give the information or advice 
sought: or he could give an answer with a clear qual-
ification that he accepted no responsibility for it or 
that it was given without that reflection or inquiry 
which a careful answer would require: or he could 
simply answer without any qualification. If he chooses 
to adopt the last course he must, I think, be held to 
have accepted some responsibility for his answer being 
given carefully, or to have accepted a relationship 
with the inquirer which requires him to exercise such 
care as the circumstances require, ^d. at 583. 
The Lords ruled that if a bank elected the third course of 
action, the first part of a cause of action founded in negligence 
would be established, i.e., a duty by the responding bank to the 
inquiring bank. (See footnotes 1 and 2). Upon establishing a 
"1. See also the statements of Lord Morris: [I]t should 
now be regarded as settled that if someone possessed of a special 
skill undertakes, quite irrespective of contract, to apply that 
skill for the assistance of another person who relies on such 
skill, a duty of care will arise. J^ d. at 594. and 
"2. See statement of Lord Hodson: [I]f in a sphere where a 
person is so placed that others could reasonably rely on his 
judgment or his skill or on his ability to make careful inquiry 
such person takes it on himself to give information or advice to, 
or allows his information or advice to be passed on to, another 
person who, as he knows, or should know, will place reliance on 
it, then a duty of care will arise. Id. at 601. 
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duty recovery would be permitted, the Lords concluded, if the 
plaintiff established "that the bank failed to discharge such 
duty, and that as a consequence [plaintiff] suffered loss.11 Ld. at 
587. In Hedley, the Lords concluded that no cause of action 
arose because the limitation "without responsibility" that pre-
ceded the responding bank's advice relieved the bank of a duty of 
care. 
This matter, unlike Hedley, does not founder at the outset; 
the appellee's advice to appellant was given without qualifica-
tion. Accordingly, the reasoning of Hedley supports recovery 
here. When a bank possesses superior knowledge regarding the 
account or credit history or financial dealings of a customer, 
and a party (such as appellant here) inquires about the financial 
health of the customer, receiving a response without qualifica-
tion, the bank is under an affirmative duty to respond accur-
ately and with care. 
The English precedent set out above is no anomaly. Utah has 
recognized a cause of action for negligent misrepresentation 
since at least 1962. The case of Ellis v. Hale 13 Utah 2d 279, 
373 P.2d 382 (1962) appears to be the first case in Utah to 
address the issue whether a cause of action exists for negligent 
misrepresentation. There, the court concluded that a cause of 
action for negligent misrepresentation could be established if 
"there is a special duty of care running from the representor to 
the representee." Id., at 385. 
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In Jardine v. Brunswick Corporation, 18 Utah 2d 378, 423 
P.2d 659 (1967), this Court further elaborated the elements of an 
action for negligent misrepresentation. In Jardine, plaintiff 
anticipated building a bowling alley using bowling equipment 
manufactured by the Defendant. Before building, Plaintiff Jardine 
asked Defendant Brunswick its advice concerning the credit 
worthiness of a certain contractor, and Brunswick replied that it 
was good but that plaintiff should "protect" himself. Based 
upon Brunswick's assurances, Jardine advanced the contractor 
$32,000.00. True to course, the contractor failed to perform and 
Jardine lost his money. Jardine then sued Brunswick, prevailed 
on the merits in the District Court (which held there was a 
negligent misrepresentation), and faced Brunswickfs appeal to 
this Court. 
This Court held that 
under some circumstances there may be a cause of action for 
deceit even though the misrepresentation was not wilfully 
false. [citing Ellis v. Hale, supra] Where one having a 
pecuniary interest in a transaction, is in a superior 
position to know material facts, and carelessly or negli-
gently makes a false representation concerning them, ex-
pecting the other party to rely and act thereon, and the 
other party reasonably does so and suffers loss in that 
transaction, the representor can be held responsible . . . 
Id. at 661-662. 
The Court thus set forth three elements in the expanding 
standard for negligent misrepresentation, i.e., (1) the necessity 
of a pecuniary interest; (2) the "superior position to know 
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material facts" of the negligent party; and (3) reasonable and 
known reliance by the inquirer. 
In Jardine, the Supreme Court decided that while Brunswick 
had a pecuniary interest, was in a superior position to know 
material facts, and knew that Jardine was relying on his repre-
sentations, there was a contributory negligence defense in the 
case and Jardine had not taken the advice of Brunswick to 
"protect" himself. In other words, Brunswick had elected the 
second of Lord Hales1 options See Hedley, supra, giving its 
advice with a "clear qualification." See Hedley, supra. There 
thus was not the necessary element of reasonable reliance by 
Jardine on all the advice of Brunswick. 
It was not until 1983 that the Utah Supreme Court was pre-
sented with another case grounded in negligent misrepresentation. 
In Christenson v. Commonwealth Land Title, 666 P.2d 302 (1983) 
the Plaintiff finally prevailed. The case, involved a title 
company, Commonwealth Land Title, who had negligently acknow-
ledged an incorrect document indicating certain properties were 
unencumbered, while in fact the properties were encumbered. 
Commonwealth was the escrow agent for a land development 
company known as AGLA. AGLA conveyed title to certain real 
estate lots to Commonwealth as trustee, and when a lot was sold, 
the proceeds were paid in full to Commonwealth, which then par-
celed out the monies to appropriate parties. The Plaintiff, as a 
trustee of a savings and loan, loaned money to AGLA on a real 
estate development, which did not produce enough revenue to pay 
15 
back the Plaintiff's loan. Therefore, to satisfy the loan obli-
gation, AGLA assigned a number of lots beneficially held by 
Commonwealth to the Plaintiff as payment for the remaining por-
tion of the loan. At the request of the Plaintiff, Commonwealth 
sent to the Plaintiff a description of the lots assigned to the 
Plaintiff, which list erroneoulsy included five lots previously 
paid off and owned by third parties. Thus, Plaintiff had ac-
cepted as partial payment, on the negligent advice of Common-
wealth, title to five lots which it did not and could not own. 
Plaintiff sued, alleging negligent misrepresentation on the 
part of Commonwealth. The District Court granted judgment for the 
Plaintiff, and this Court affirmed on the ground that negligent 
misrepresentations were made to the Plaintiff. This Court 
quoted Jardine with approval and stated: 
As the definition [from Jardine] suggests, a casual 
statement or gratuitous advice from a stranger to a trans-
action cannot be the grounds for negligent misrepresent-
ation. The recipient of such information could not reason-
ably rely on it because he could hardly expect the repre-
sentor to exercise prudence and care in making the state-
ment that could warrant reliance. IcJ. at 305. 
Thus, if the advice comes from a stranger with no special 
relationship wherein one is expected to rely on the statements of 
the other, then no special duty attaches. But if the advice 
comes from someone who is trained in the business of supplying 
information, and does supply information, a higher standard ap-
plies. As the Court concluded: 
If . . . the information is given in the capacity of one 
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in the business of supplying such information, that care 
and diligence should be exercised which is compatible with 
the particular business or profession involved. Those who 
deal with such persons do so because the of advantages 
which they expect to derive from this special competence. 
The law, therefore, may well predicate on such a relation-
ship, the duty of care to insure the accuracy and validity 
of the information, ^d. at 305 citing from 1 F. Harper & 
F. James, Section 7.6 at 546. (See footnote 3). 
In analyzing Commonwealth's claim, the Court enumerated: 
(1) Commonwealth did have a pecuniary interest, for it 
was paid to be the escrow agent and to disburse the proceeds of 
lot sales to AGLA and its assigns; 
(2) Commonwealth was in a superior position to have 
knowledge about the status of the lots; 
(3) because Commonwealth was in a superior position to 
know of the status of the lots, and did not utilize that know-
ledge as it should have, Commonwealth was negligent in signing 
the acknowledgements; 
(4) Commonwealth knew that the Plaintiff would rely on 
the representations of Commonwealth; 
(5) Plaintiff's reliance on the information of Common-
"3. Harper & James took their conclusion from several New 
York cases which unequivocably hold that if the information 
is received from one in a peculiar position to supply the 
information, the information must be accurate or an action 
in negligent misrepresentation will lie. See, e.g. Glanxer 
v^ Shepard, 233 N.Y. 236, 135 N.E. 275, 23 A.L.R. 1425 
(1923); Doyle y^ Chatham Bank, 253 N.Y. 369, 171 N.E. 574 
(1930); Mulroy v. Wright, 185 Mich. 84, 240 N.W. 116 
(1932) . 
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wealth was reasonable; and 
(6) the reliance on negligently given false information 
led to a loss by the Plaintiff. 
The Court found that "a duty arose to use reasonable care 
to not mislead one whom Commonwealth knew would justifiably rely 
upon the facts as represented." Ld. at 306. Cases from other 
jurisdictions have reached similar conclusions with a nearly 
identical analysis. In Arizona Title Insurance and Trust Co. v. 
0'Mailey Lumber Co., 14 Ariz.App. 486, 484 P.2d 639 (1971) a 
title insurance company was employed as an escrow agent by a 
large construction project. The duty of the title company was to 
disburse funds to contractors working on the project. As part of 
its actions, it informed the various contractors of the progress 
of the project. Several contractors contacted Arizona Title for 
assurances that there were sufficient escrow funds for the con-
tractors to be paid, and Arizona Title regularly but negligently 
gave out such assurances. When the money ran out before the 
contractors were all paid the Arizona court held that Arizona 
Title was guilty of negligent misrepresentation. The court re-
lied on a number of authorities on the subject, including 
Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts Section 102 at 719 et seq. 
(3rd ed. 1964), Harper and James, supra, and the Restatement of 
Torts. (See footnote 4). 
"4. As does Hedley, supra, the Restatement succinctly 
defines negligent misrepresentation as follows: 
Section 552. Information Negligently Supplied for the Guid-
ance of Others. 
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One who in the course of his business or profession supplies 
The Court strongly concluded that, in Arizona, at least, 
Arizona Title owed no contractual or trust duty to the 
contractors, and . . . apart from any representations 
made by Arizona Title to the contractors concerning 
the availability of funds, it did not owe the contrac-
tors the duty to make any calculations to ascertain 
whether sufficient funds would or would not be avail-
able to pay the contractors for their work. In other 
words, Arizona Title had no duty to speak or respond 
to the contractors1 inquiries at all. But if it chose 
to speak, we think that under all of the circumstances 
its business relationship with the contractors carried 
with it a duty to exercise reasonable care in making 
representations about presently ascertainable facts. 
Id. at 492, 484 P.2d at 645. (emphasis in original). 
(See footnote 5) 
The Nevada Supreme Court has also rendered a decision dir-
ectly applicable in to the matter at bar. Nevada National Bank 
v. Gold Star Meat Company 514 P.2d 651 (1973) is a case in which 
the Gold Star Meat Company was presented with an order from 
Holiday Ranch whose parent company had an account at the Nevada 
National Bank. Gold Star contacted Nevada National and inquired 
about the credit of Holiday Ranch, and Nevada National stated the 
"4 (cont.) information for the guidance of others in their 
business transactions is subject to liability for harm caused to 
them by their reliance upon the information if 
(a) he fails to exercise that care and competence in 
obtaining and communicating the information which its recipient 
is justified in expecting, and 
(b) the harm is suffered 
(i) by the person or one of the class of persons for 
whose guidance the inforation was supplied, and 
(ii) because of his justifiable reliance upon it in a 
transaction in which it was in-tended to influence his conduct or 
in a transaction substantially identical therewith. 
"5. The above quotation from the Arizona Court, was quoted 
verbatim by the Christenson v. Commonwealth court, and by refer-
ence, made a part of the law of Utah. 
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credit was sufficient, even though Holiday Ranch had no account 
at the time with the bank. 
Gold Star extended credit, Holiday Ranch failed to pay, and 
suit was filed against the bank for negligent misrepresentation. 
Gold Star prevailed in the district court, and Nevada National 
appealed. The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed, stating 
[W]here a bank office through its officer undertakes 
to give advice, even gratuitously, that officer is 
bound to use the skill and expertise which he has or 
which he could be presumed to have. When that 
officer negligently or carelessly attempts to 
discharge that duty by misrepresenting facts within 
his knowledge, the bank should be held responsible for 
those misrepresentations, ^ d at 653-654. 
That the bank officer had no duty to respond the inquiry was 
acknowledged by the Court, but once he "voluntarily ventured on 
such a course of action, he was thenceforth required to exercise 
due care." I_d. at 654. And such duty of care must be carried out 
with accuracy and "full candor" (_Id) . at 654 for "it was forsee-
able that after a specific inquiry about the credit of a poten-
tial customer and a favorable disclosure by the [bank], that an 
ordinary, prudent person would extend credit based on that favor-
able information." Id., at 654. 
ii. Appellee bank owed a duty of due care to appellant 
The above case law establishes that once an agent with the 
responsibility to disburse funds takes on the function of re-
porting the financial status of a project, that agent owes a duty 
of due care to third parties to accurately report the true nature 
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of the financial resources of the project. Both the Christenson 
v. Commonwealth Title and the Arizona Title cases are squarely in 
support of the situation at hand, and the analysis of those cases 
mandate reversal of the District Court for: 
(1) Basin State did have a pecuniary interest in the 
project because it was the disbursing agent and was paid a fee 
for such services; 
(2) Basin State did not have a duty to respond to the 
inquiries of Tree Products concerning the financial health of the 
project; 
(3) but Basin State did undertake, on two separate 
occassions, to answer the inquiries of Tree Products concerning 
the ability of Amiron and Bales to pay their accounts; 
(4) yet Basin State answered the inquiries negligently, 
being dilatory in its duties to inspect the project and in-
accurate in its analysis of the real financial health of the 
project; (See footnote 6). 
(5) Basin State was in a superior position to know 
about the financial health of the project; 
(6) Basin State knew that Tree Products was using the 
information supplied to form an opinion concerning the advisibil 
"6. In fact, in the deposition of Dan Turner, (who took over the 
responsibilities of disbursement from the prior employee who had 
also incorrectly indicated that the project was fully funded and 
there would be no problems with payment), Mr. Turner admits that 
he was not aware of the financial status of the project or per-
centage completion of the project or progress on the budget until 
after the lenders refused a request for a draw in September. 
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ity of extending credit to the project; 
(7) Tree Product's reliance on the representations of 
Basin State was reasonable in light of the fact that no other 
entity apparently had any better access to the records than did 
Basin State; 
(8) Tree Products did suffer damages from relying on 
the statements of Basin State that the project was fully funded, 
for Tree Products would not have returned the payment made in 
July if Tree Products had been accurately informed of the 
precarious financial status of the project, even though the 
payment was not a full payment. Therefore, the damages are 
certain and capable of calculation. 
Thus, the finding of Judge Davidson in the lower court that 
,fthe argument of Plaintiff Tree Products would place the bank in 
the position of owing conflicting duties and of owing duties not 
contemplated in the making of the construction loan" is correct 
only in the limited sense that the bank may not have consciously 
contemplated the duty of correctly reporting the current finan-
cial status of the project to prospective contractors and sup-
pliers of materials at the time it made the the construction 
loan. But when the bank did take upon itself to report to Tree 
Products the current financial status of the project, the bank 
also assumed the duty of accurately reporting the current finan-
cial status of the project. When a bank negligently fails 
in its duty of accuracy as set forth above by this Court, the 
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bank becomes guilty of negligent misrepresentation; accordingly, 
Tree Products is entitled to its damages, as prayed in its Motion 
for Summary Judgment, suffered as a result of the negligent 
misrepresentations of appellee. 
B. TREE PRODUCTS DAMAGES WERE THE RESULT OF THE NEGLIGENCE 
OF BASIN STATE IN REPORTING THE CURRENT FINANCIAL STATUS OF THE 
PROJECT, WHICH NEGLIGENT REPORTING CAUSED TREE PRODUCTS TO SUR-
RENDER ITS PARTIAL PAYMENT FOR THE PROSPECT OF RECEIVING PAYMENT 
IN FULL 
As set forth in the affidavit of Joseph Zabaldo, p. 5 para. 
23, Tree Product's loss resulted not from their actions in 
disputing the amount of monies due and owing for the cedar 
siding, but resulted from the negligent statements by Basin State 
that the project was "fully funded" and that payments would 
certainly be forthcoming. 
C. DEFENDANT FAILED TO RAISE THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE OF THE 
STATUTE OF FRAUDS (UTAH CODE SECTION 25-5-5) IN ITS RESPONSIVE 
PLEADINGS AND IS PROCEDURALLY BARRED FROM RAISING THE ISSUE AT A 
LATER DATE 
Rule 8(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states: 
(c) Affirmative Defenses. 
In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set 
forth affirmatively . . . statute of frauds . . . and any 
other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative 
defense. . . . 
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Rule 12(h) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is entitled 
"Waiver of Defenses" and sets forth, in applicable part: 
(h) Waiver of Defenses. 
A party waives all defenses and objections which 
he does not present either by motion as hereinabove 
provided [Rule 12(b) motions, motion for judgment on 
the pleadings, motion for more definite statement and 
motion to strike] or, if he has made no motion, in 
his answer or reply . . . . 
The appellee failed to raise the affirmative defense of the 
statute of frauds in either its answer or answer to the amended 
complaint. Nor did the appellee make at any a motion to amend 
its answer to include the defense of the statute of frauds. In 
fact, the first time the issue was raised appeared in the appel-
lee's Motion for Summary Judgment, and according to the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, supra, and the Utah authority cited, 
infra, the Statute of Frauds affirmative defense must be raised 
in the reply or answer. 
One of the first Utah cases to address the issue of raising 
the affirmative defense of the Statute of Frauds is W.W.&W.B. 
Gardner, Inc. v. Pappas 24 Utah 2d 264, 470 P.2d 252 (1970) which 
states: 
However, the basis upon which the instant appeal 
should be resolved is that the Statute of Frauds was 
not properly pleaded and therefore did not constitute 
a defense. [Defendant] filed an answer in which they 
pleaded a general denial; they filed simultaneously a 
separate motion to dismiss on the ground that the 
plaintifffs claim was barred by the Statute of Frauds. 
Rule 12(b), U.R.C.P., specifies the defenses which may 
be asserted by motion, defendants1 ground is not 
included therein. Rule 8(c), U.R.C.P., provides that 
the Statute of Frauds is an affirmative defense. 
Defendants did not follow this procedure. Jj3. at 253. 
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In Staker v. Huntingon Cleveland Irrigation Company 664 P.2d 
1188 (1983), the defendant moved the trial court, on the day of 
the trial, to allow an amendment of its answer to assert a stat-
ute of limitations defense. The trial court denied the motion, 
and the defendant appealed to the Supreme Court. In speaking to 
the issue, this Court states, 
The statute of limitations defense must be pleaded 
as an affirmative defense in a responsive pleading, or 
it is waived, Utah R.Civ.P. 8(c) and 12(h), unless an 
amended pleading asserting the defense is allowed 
pursuant to the requirements of Rule 15(a). Ld. at 
1190. 
Another 1983 case, Valley Bank and Trust Co. v.Wilken 668 P 
2d. 493 (1983) applies very closely to the case at hand, for the 
defendant/appellant failed to raise an affirmative defense in her 
answer, and raised the issue for the first time in summary judg-
ment. The Court disapproved of the timing, and says: 
The appellant's sole contention is that the 
trial court erred in granting summary judgment because 
her husband's affidavit had raised the defense of 
failure of consideration. The difficulty with her 
argument is that she was obligated to raise that 
defense in her answer to the complaint. She made only 
a general denial in her answer and did not raise any 
affirmative defenses. Failure of consideration is an 
affirmative defense and must be pleaded as such. Rule 
8(c), U.R.C.P. She made no effort to move to amend 
her answer under Rule 15 to raise that defense. She 
could not raise it by means of an affidavit in 
opposition to summary judgment. It is not the office 
of an affidavit in opposition to a motion for summary 
judgment to provide a means of introducing defenses 
which have not been raised by the answer or by proper 
motion. Rule 12 (b), U.R.C.P. . . . Since the defense 
was not properly raised, she waived it. Ld. at 494. 
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D. IF THE COURT DOES NOT DISMISS THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
ISSUE ON PROCEDURAL GROUNDS, UTAH CODE SECTION 25-5-5 CONTINUES 
TO BE INAPPLICABLE IN THIS MATTER AND IS NOT A BAR TO THE 
MISREPRESENTATIONS OF BASIN STATE 
i. The Statute 
Utah Code Ann. 25-5-5 (1953) states: 
To charge a person upon a representation as to the 
credit of a third person, such representation, or 
some memorandum thereof, must be in writing sub-
scribed by the party to be charged therewith. 
ii. Derivation of the Statute-Lord Tenterton's Act 
The above statute, referred to as Lord Tenterton's Act, 
comes directly from a 1828 English statute amending the Statute 
of Frauds of 1677. The content of Lord Tenterton's Act is as 
follows: 
No action shall be brought whereby to charge any 
person upon or by reason of any representation or 
assurance made or given concerning or relating to the 
character, conduct, credit, ability, trade, or 
dealings of any other person, to the intent or 
purposes that such other person may obtain credit, 
money, or goods upon [it], unless such representation 
or assurance be made in writing, signed by the party 
to be charged therewith. [Section 6 of the Statute of 
Frauds] 
The Act was enacted to close a perceived "loophole" in the ori-
ginal Statute of Frauds. As explained by the House of Lords in 
W.B. Anderson £ Sons v. Rhodes, 862 [1967] 2 All E.R.: 
The law lords based their decision partly on the 
history of the section [Lord Tenterton's Act]. 
Because s. 4 of the Statute of Frauds (1677) made a 
promise to answer for a debt, default or miscarriage 
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of another unenforceable unless in writing, a custom 
grew up in the profession of alleging a fraudulent 
representation as to credit in order in order to 
circumvent the statute. Apparently juries, 
displaying their traditional anxiety to find verdicts 
in favour of plaintiffs, were easily induced to find 
fraud where no real fraud existed. To put an end to 
this practice, Lord Tenderton introduced the bill 
containing this section, and it was passed by 
Parliament. _Id. at 862. 
The first major English decision interpreting Lord 
Tenterton's Act arose in 1918 in the case of Banbury v. Bank of 
Montreal, [1918-19] E.R. Rep. 1; [1918] A.C. 626. There, the 
House of Lords unanimously held that the section applied to 
fraudulent misrepresentations but not to a negligent misrepre-
sentation. The case involved a customer of the Bank of Montreal, 
Banbury, who asked the Bank of Montreal if he might prudently 
lend the Westholme Lumber Co. a large sum of money. The bank 
advised Banbury that the loan would be prudent, and Banbury acted 
upon the advice. Unfortunately, the advice was negligent (the 
loan was ill-advised), and Banbury lost the entire part of his 
loan. Banbury sued the Bank of Montreal, and the Bank of 
Montreal defended on the grounds that the representation as to 
the credit of Westholme Lumber Co. was barred by Lord Tenterton's 
Act. 
In the opinion of Lord Finlay, 
an action of this nature does not fall within s. 6 of 
Lord Tenterton's Act [referring to credit of a third 
party] at all. The action is for the breach of the 
duty which it is alleged the bank had undertaken of 
advising the appellant [Banbury], and not for 
[fraudulent] misrepresentation. [1918-19] All E.R. 
Rep. at p. 5; [1918] A.C. 639. 
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And the opinion of Lord Wrenbury is that Lord Tenterton's Act 
does not apply to an innocent misrepresentation, for 
The words of the section are, "to charge any person 
upon or by reason of any representation," &c. The 
words "charge any person upon any representation" 
point, I think, plainly to an action for deceit. To 
maintain such an action there must be fraud and there 
must be damage. . . . Fraud is the cause of action. 
If there existed a duty, an action lies for 
negligence, and breach of duty, and in that action 
the fact there was a misrepresentation, although 
innocent, is material. . . . For these reasons I hold 
that in this action, which is not an action for 
fraud, but an action for negligence or breach of duy, 
the appellants are right in their contention that 
Lord Tenterton's Act does not apply. 1A. at 28. 
In fact, the Lords found that the bank did not have any 
contractual duty to report to Banbury, but did have a duty, once 
it undertook to advise Banbury, to act in a reasonable manner to 
fulfill that assumed duty to Banbury. Thus, the case establishes 
that negligent misrepresentations as to the credit of another do 
not fall with the scope of Lord Tenterton's statute because the 
statute was designed to prevent the use of a claim of fraud as a 
means of circumventing the Statute of Frauds. The statute, 
however, was not intended to apply to a cause of action grounded 
in negligence. Therefore, if the defendant makes a negligent 
misrepresentation (as in this case), the plaintiff's cause of 
action lies in a claim for breach of duty, which is beyond the 
purview of the Statute of Frauds. 
In 1967 the English House of Lords reaffirmed its 
decision in Banbury. W.B. Anderson &Sons v. Rhodes, 862 [1967] 2 
All E.R., concerned a food brokerage company, Rhodes, which did 
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business with a newly formed brokerage house by the name of 
Taylor, Ltd, Rhodes had some success with Taylor in the initial 
stages of their relationship, but failed to keep close track of 
Taylor's account which soon came into default. Rhodes was 
unaware of the account status, and recommended Taylor to several 
other brokerage firms as a good credit risk. Very soon there-
after, Taylor became insolvent and the brokerage firms which had 
extended credit to Taylor on Rhodes' advice sued Rhodes for 
negligent misrepresentation. 
The plaintiffs argued that Rhodes was negligent in its 
handling of the account, and Rhodes defended on the grounds of 
Lord Tenterton's Act. Rhodes asserted that it had given a repre-
sentation about the credit of a third person, the representation 
was not in writing, and therefore plaintiffs' claim was barred by 
the Statute of Frauds, specifically Lord Tenterton's Act. 
After citing from Banbury, supra, Lord Cairns spoke for the 
Court and reaffirmed Banbury. He reasoned that: 
An action for fraudulent misrepresentation as to 
credit is an action on the representation and is 
barred by Lord Tenterton's Act unless in writing. An 
action in respect of a negligent misrepresentation is 
not an action on the representation and is an action 
for the breach of a duty of care. . . . The conclusion 
is that an action for breach of a duty of care in 
making a representation is not barred by the Act of 
1828. Id. at 865. 
Thus, Lord Cairn, having examined the previous authorities 
and the legislative background of the case, found conclusively 
that Lord Tenterton's Act does not apply to a negligent misrepre-
sentation, that the Act was enacted to halt avoidance of the 
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Statute of Frauds, and that in a negligent misrepresentation case 
the action is not an action on the misrepresentation itself but 
is rather an action on the actor's breach of its duty of care. 
Therefore, an act which seeks to end fraudulent written misrep-
resentations is inapplicable where the cause of action is founded 
in negligence. 
Public policy also supports the limited reading of Lord 
Tenterton's Act given by the House of Lords. The Statute of 
Frauds, which was designed to avoid fraud, can often be a power-
ful engine for promoting fraud. For this reason, courts gen-
erally give the Statute of Frauds a limited—even grudging— 
reading. See, e.g., 56 ALR 3d 1037 (discussing willingness of 
many courts to permit recovery in actions grounded on promissory 
estoppel despite arguable application of the Statute of Frauds.) 
Where, as in this case, a complainant does not seek to hold 
another to contractual duties that should normally be memorial-
ized in a writing (the principal rationale for the Statute of 
Frauds), but rather seeks to hold a defendant liable for its 
breach of a duty of due care, a court should not permit the 
statute to be raised as shield against civic obligation. In 
this case, for example, there is little question that the appel-
lee bank made negligent representation regarding the credit-
worthiness of Amiron, nor is there any question that appellant 
relied on those representations to its damage. In these circum-
stances, appellee should not be permitted to assert that a "gap 
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filling" provision of the Statute of Frauds insulates it from its 
obligation to conduct its business in the manner of a reasonably 
prudent banker. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully requests the Court to set aside the 
Judgment of the lower court and to enter judgment for the appel-
lant based on the appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Respectfully submitted this 31st day of January, 1986. 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
TREE FKODUCTS COMPANY, an 
Oregon corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
AMIRON DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, 
a Utah Corporation, et al., 
Defendants. 
ECONOMY BUILDERS SUPPLY, INC., ] 
a Utah Corporation, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. ! 
AMIRON DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ; 
a Utah Corporation, et al., 
Defendants. 
i SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 11,710 
Civil No. 11,923 
The above captioned ir.atter came before the Court pursuant to 
Plaintiff, Tree Products Company's, Motion for Summary Judgment 
and Defendant, Basin State Bank's, Motion for Surrjr.ary Judgment. 
The issue before the Court was what duty, if any, was owed by 
Basin Sict^ Bank to Tree Products Company, to inspect the project 
and to supervise and manage the construction loan. All other 
issues have been resolved either by rulings of the Court or 
stipulation of the parties. 
Counsel for Tree Products Company and Basin State Bank have 
submitted Memoranda setting forth the undisputed facts and the 
parties having agreed that the facts are undisputed and that 
pursuant thereto the Court should determine, as a matter of law, 
the duty owed, if any, by Basin State Bank to the Plaintiff. The 
Court having reviewed the Memoranda, submitted by the parties, 
having reviewed the documents in the file, having heard argument 
by counsel and having taken the matter under advisement and 
entered its Ruling and being fully advised enters the following 
conclusions : 
1. The loan agreement is between Basin State Bank and 
Amiron Development. The funds were disbursed under the direction 
of developer, Amiron. 
2. Basin State Bank, under the direction of Amiron, did 
tender payment to Tree Products Company. Due to a controversy 
between Tree Products Company and Amiron, Tree Products Company 
refused payment. Basin State Bank then, at the direction of 
Amiron, disbursed the money to pay other bills of Amiron. 
3. The argument of Plaintiff, Tree Products Company, would 
put Basin State Bank in a position of owing conflicting duties to 
various parties and of owing duties not contemplated when it 
entered into the construction loan. The araument of Tree 
Products Company would require that Basin State Bank be in the 
position of project overseer and manager, not only of the 
funding, but also of the actual construction of the project. 
That is not a duty that was contemplated by Basin State Bank or 
by any bank when it enters into a construction funding 
arrangement. 
4. Based upon the findings herein, and the undisputed 
facts the Court finds that no duty was owed by Basin State Bank 
to Plaintiff, Tree Products Company, and that therefore, Basin 
State Bank is entitled, as a matter of law, to an Order of 
Dismissal with prejudice on that issue. 
Pursuant to the findings of the Court and the Court being 
fully advised, the Court hereby grants Basin State Bank's Motion 
for Summary Judgment and denies Plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and hereby; 
ORDERS, ADJUDGES AND DECREES that the issue remaining before 
the Court regarding the duty owed by Basin State Bank to Tree 
Products Company is hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this day of February, 1985. 
Richard C. Davidson 
District Judge 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
TREE PRODUCTS COMPANY, an ) 
Oregon Corporation, ) 
Plaintiff, ) RULING 
vs. ) 
AMIRON DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, a Utah ) 
corporation and BALES CONSTRUCTION ) 
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation, ) 
et al ) 
Defendants. ) Civil No. 11,710 
ECONOMY BUILDERS SUPPLY, INC., ) 
et al, ) 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) 
AMIRON DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, ) 
et al, ) 
Defendants. ) Civil No. 11,923 
This matter came before the Court pursuant to the motion 
made by Plaintiff Tree Products Cocmpany alleging negligence on 
the part of Defendant Basin State Bank. The Court having heard 
the argument and having taken the matter under advisement now 
makes the following ruling. 
Plaintiff Tree Products alleges that Basin State Bank had a 
duty to inspect the project, to supervise and manage the loan and 
that such duty was owed to Tree Products. However, the facts in 
this case show that the loan agreement was entered into between 
Basin State Bank and Amiron Development. Subsequently, the funds 
were disbursed at the direction of Amiron. While Tree Products 
may have been an ultimate beneficiary of that agreement, no duty 
exists on the part of the bank which is owed to them. In 
addition, in carrying out its duty to Amiron, Basin State did 
tender payment to Tree Products but due to controversy with 
Amiron, Tree Products refused payment. At the direction of 
Amiron, the money was utilized to pay other bills. 
The argument of Plaintiff Tree Products would place the bank 
in the position of owing conflicting duties and of owing duties 
not contemplated in the making of the construction loan. The 
Bank would be set up in the position of project overseer and 
manager not only of the construction funding but also of the 
actual construction. This is not such a duty as any bank would 
contract for and is not what was done here. 
Defendant Basin State Banks1 Motion for Summary Judgment 
dated November 9, 1984 is hereby granted. 
DATED this /45 day of February, 19 85. 
BY THE COURT: 
cc: Mark F. Robinson & David L. Glazier 
Clark B. Allred 
Joseph R. Fox 
Bruce A. Maak 
Robert A. Alderman 
Kevin O'Connell 
Kent T. Anderson 
Joseph Rust 
